

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 6285

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, GE

SUBJECT: GDR FOREIGN MINISTER ON MBFR AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

AT NOVEMBER 12 POLADS MEETING, FRG REP (HOYNCK) HANDED OUT TEXT (BELOW) OF GDR FONMIN WINZER'S RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND INTERVIEW OF NOVEMBER 6. WHILE CRITICIZING NATO POSITION IN MBFR TALKS, WINZER SEEMS TO SUGGEST IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF HIS RESPONSE THAT PROGRESS IN VIENNA WOULD FOLLOW SUCCESSFUL CSCE CONCLUSION. SO FAR AS MISSION IS AWARE, THIS IS FIRST REFERENCE TO CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE MADE BY NON-SOVIET COMMUNIST LEADER.
BEGIN TEXT.

UNDER THE HEADING "FOR A PERMANENT AREA OF PEACE AND COOPERATION" HERR WINZER ELABORATED ON THE GDR VIEWS ON CSCE AND MBFR. ONE OF THE QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM AND HIS ANSWER WERE AS FOLLOWS:

QUESTION: THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT MEASURES OF MILITARY DE-
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TANTE PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN THE CONTINUATION OF THE DETENTE PROCESS. IN THIS CONTEXT, COMRDE BREZHNEV THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY, A FEW DAYS AGO CALLED ATTENTION

TO THE FACT THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, SOME PARTICIPANTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE ADOPTING UNREALISTIC POSITIONS. WHAT ARE YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS?

ANSWER: IT IS BEYOND DOUBT THAT POLITICAL DETENTE HAS TO BE COMPLEMENTED BY MEASURES OF MILITARY DETENTE. IF POLITICAL DETENTE IS TO BE OF PERMANENCE - AND THIS IS WHAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE - THE CONTRADICTION - OR, AS COMRADE GROMYKO EXPRESSED IT AT THE XXIXTH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: THE PARADOXICAL SITUATION - BETWEEN CONTINUING POLITICAL DETENTE AND AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE ARMS RACE MUST BE OVERCOME BY EFFECTIVE MEASURES OF ARMS LIMITATION AND ARMS CONTROL.

HOWEVER, IT IS NOT PART OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE SECURITY CONFERENCE TO WORK OUT CONCRETE STEPS IN THE MILITARY FIELD. FOR GOOD REASONS, THE DISCUSSION OF THESE QUESTIONS HAS BEEN LEFT TO OTHER BODIES, SUCHAS THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AS FAR AS CENTRAL EUROPE IS CONCERNED. IT CAN ONLY BE THE TASK OF THE SECURITY CONFERENCE TO WORK OUT MEASURES FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF POLITICAL CONFIDENCE AS THEY HAVE BEEN PROPOSED BY THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ADVANCED NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES AND THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT SUCH MANOEUVRES. THESE MEASURES AS WELL AS THE RESULTS OF THE WHOLE SECURITY CONFERENCE WILL HAVE A FAVOURABLE EFFECT ON THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD.

THE PURPOSE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IS THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE TO BE WORKED OUT WHICH DO NOT GRANT ANY OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND WHICH DO NOT AFFECT THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER SIDE. ONLY IF THIS BASIC PRINCIPLE OF ALL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS IS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WILL THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS LEAD TO ANY RESULTS. IT WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WILL ACCEPT ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH NATO WOULD BE GIVEN UN-CONFIDENTIAL

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ILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES. HOWEVER, THIS IS EXACTLY THE OBJECT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. THUS, TO MENTION ONLY A FEW EXAMPLES, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE SUPPORTED TO REDUCE THREE TIMES THE NUMBER OF TROOPS COMPARED WITH THE NATO SIDE, AND THE FORCES OF GREAT BRITAIN, THE FRG, BELGIUM , THE NETHERLANDS, CANANA AND LUXEMBOURG ARE TO BE EXEMPT FROM REDUCTIONS FOR A LONG TIME AND ALL AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON UNITS ARE TO BE FOREVER EXEMPTED. WHILE THE WESTERN SIDE IS TRYING IN VIENNA TO GET THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT THREE TIMES HIGHER REDUCTION QUOTAS, THERE ARE AUTHORITATIVE VOICES IN NATO COUNTRIES PLEADING FOR A STRENGTHENING INSTEAD OF A RESUC-TION OF NATO FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THERE ARE "STRUCTURAL REFORMS", MILITARY REINFORCEMENT PROGRAMMES,

ANNOUNCEMENTS ON THE ACTIVATION OF ADDITIONAL BRIGADES - ALL THESE ARE MEASURES WHICH ARE IN OPEN CONFLICT WITH TROOP REDUCTION AND ARMS LIMITATION. SUCH AN APPROACH FURTHER COMPLICATES THE ALREADY DIFFICULT VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THE POSITIVE POLITICAL CHANGES IN EUROPE WERE POSSIBLE BECAUSE THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS WAS TACKLED IN A REALISTIC MANNER AND BECAUSE THOSE CONCERNED PROCEEDED FROM THE REAL BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE. WITHOUT THIS REALISTIC APPROACH, THERE WOULD BE NO EUROPEAN TREATIES AND NO EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. THIS EXPERIENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES ALSO DURING THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOCIALIST PARTICIPANTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAVE MADE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE NOT DEMANDING MORE FROM THE WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT THEY ARE THEMSELVES PREPARED TO GIVE. IN MAKING THEIR PROPOSALS, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ALSO BORNE IN MIND CONSIDERATIONS OF THE WESTERN NEGOTIATION PARTNERS, WHICH TESTIFIES TO AN EFFORT TO COME TO ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED. WE ARE ENTITLED TO EXPECT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO APPROACH THE SOLUTION OF THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS IN A SIMILARLY CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER AND TO SHOW A WILLINGNESS FOR COMPROMISES. IF THIS IS DONE, THE FIRST STEPS TOWARDS FORCE REDUCTION AND ARMS LIMITATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL BE POSSIBLE IN 1975.

END TEXT.

PEREZ.

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